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The global security community contin-
ues to view a potential bioterrorist event
with concern. Kofi Annan, former Secre-
tary General of the United Nations, stated
‘‘the most important under-addressed
threat relating to terrorism…is that of
terrorists using a biological weapon’’ [1].
The European Commission believes that
biological weapons ‘‘may have particular
attractions for terrorists’’ [2]. The United
States Commission on the Prevention of
Weapons of Mass Destruction Prolifera-
tion and Terrorism believes it is very likely
that a weapon of mass destruction will be
used in a terrorist attack by the end of
2013, and that an attack with a biological
weapon is more likely than one with a
nuclear weapon [3].
There is good reason for concern.
Infectious diseases elicit instinctive fears
that some terrorist organizations appear to
have the intent to exploit [4]. The 2001
anthrax attacks in the United States,
believed to have been caused by a single
actor [5], were a keen reminder of the
ability of bioterrorism to cause death and
societal disruption. Such concerns have
been linked to the rapid progress in life
science research. The most advanced
techniques 20 years ago are today routine
(and some, like DNA synthesis, are also
much cheaper [6]), while new fields,
notably synthetic biology [7,8], have
opened frontiers previously inconceivable.
Furthermore, expertise in life science
research is globally dispersed, and meth-
odologies for synthesizing and/or altering
the virulence of pathogens in the labora-
tory have already been published in high-
profile scientific journals. Activities that
have garnered substantial attention in-
clude chemically synthesizing the poliovi-
rus [9] and the WX174 bacteriophage
[10], demonstrating the importance of a
variola virus gene for its virulence [11],
and reconstituting the 1918 influenza virus
[12]. Each has been classified as dual use
research of concern (DURC), which is
defined by the US National Science
Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB)
as ‘‘research that, based on current
understanding, can be reasonably antici-
pated to provide knowledge, products, or
technologies that could be directly misap-
plied by others’’ [13].
DURC creates a tension between free-
dom of research and national security [14–
17]. As security communities have pushed
for tighter oversight of research, scientific
communities have been quick to grasp that
certain biosecurity regulations, such as
export controls [18] or visa controls for
foreign scientists [19], run the risk of being
inadvertently disruptive [20–24]. Mem-
bers of the US NSABB have even argued
that the inhibition of life science research
could be considered a threat to national
security and public health in and of itself
[25]. Yet as concerns the rationale for
biosecurity controls, the scientific commu-
nity has been generally muted. Although
this may be related to the secrecy
surrounding intelligence about terrorist
organizations, classified snippets of infor-
mation should not have priority over
expert technical input. Ceding the debate
to the security community could lead to
inaccurate threat assessments and the
adoption of inappropriate biosecurity con-
trol measures.
The European Centre for Disease
Prevention and Control (ECDC) was
established in 2005 with the mandate to
strengthen Europe’s defenses against in-
fectious diseases through developing Eu-
ropean Union–wide surveillance networks
and early warning systems, coordinating
scientific studies, and identifying emerging
health threats [26]. As a part of ECDC
efforts to evaluate potential bioterrorism
threats, we reviewed 27 assessments (pub-
lished between 1997 and 2008) that
address the links between life science
research and bioterrorism with the objec-
tive of identifying DURC relevant for
public health (Text S1). The focus of the
review was limited to the application of
DURC by terrorist organizations and it
did not consider state-sponsored biological
weapons programs.
The 27 assessments were selected based
upon a literature review and interviews
with a panel of international experts.
Collectively, the 27 assessments explicitly
cite a wide range of DURC activities.
Based upon these, we conducted a threat
assessment during an expert workshop.
The purpose of this threat assessment was
to identify those DURC activities that
would be the most easily deployed by
bioterrorists. The key parameters for this
assessment were the level of expertise
required for conducting any given DURC
activity and the level of equipment re-
quired to conduct the work. In the threat
assessment, an estimated threat level was
calculated for each DURC activity by
giving a score ranging from 1 (high
threshold) to 3 (low threshold) for both
parameters, and then multiplying these
scores to yield the final threat, which could
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a higher likelihood of success if they were
to be undertaken by bioterrorists (Text
S1).
The overall ranking provides an indica-
tion of the threat spectrum related to the
ability of bioterrorists to exploit life science
research (Table 1), and it suggests that
‘‘low tech’’ activities may be especially
attractive to bioterrorists. This opposes the
tendency of biosecurity discussions to be
rather more focused on ‘‘high tech’’
research: typically, the potential negative
consequences of research falling into the
wrong hands are accentuated while the
likelihood of this occurring is inadequately
considered. Is the availability of material,
methodologies, and high-level expertise,
none of which should be taken for granted,
even adequate for the development of a
sophisticated bioweapon? Technology is
much more than the sum of its material
and informational aspects. Social contin-
gencies and tacit knowledge, serendipity
and unpredictability, institutional memo-
ry, and many other factors are essential to
the successful design and deployment of
any given technology, including (if not
especially) biological weapons [27,28].
Interviews with the Wimmer group about
the poliovirus synthesis [9], for example,
highlight that replicating the experiment is
a very challenging and time-consuming
procedure even for virologists familiar
with the experimental system [29]. It is
not obvious that extrapolating the meth-
ods from this work for other purposes—or
to another laboratory—would have been
successful. The challenge is surely even
greater when resource, time, or other
constraints (such as the need to be
clandestine) are involved.
The recent history of bioterrorism also
suggests that more attention should be
allotted to low tech threats [30]. An
extensive review of biocrimes in the 20th
century argued that although bioterrorists
might acquire some capabilities, there is
‘‘reason to doubt the ease with which such
groups could cause mass casualties’’ [31].
Aum Shinrikyo, for example, was not
successful in procuring, producing, or
dispersing anthrax and botulinum toxin
in the 1990s, while Al Qaeda is believed to
have failed to obtain and work with
pathogens by the early 2000s [32], and
this likely remains the case. In comparison,
the contamination of food and water, and
direct injection/application of a pathogen,
all have much lower technical hurdles and
might be expected to be rather more
successfully deployed [31]. The best-
known example is the contamination of
salad bars with Salmonella by the Rajnee-
shee cult in 1984, which led to roughly 751
illnesses and 45 hospitalizations [33]. It
remains the only known incident in which
a terrorist organization, rather than an
individual, deployed a biological agent in
the US [31].
We do not suggest that high tech
bioterrorism threats do not exist—rather,
Table 1. Threat assessment for research areas of concern.
Expertise Threshold
Low – (3)
Medium – (2)
High – (1)
Equipment Threshold
Low – (3)
Medium – (2)
High – (1)
Threat
Level
Enhance the dissemination of a biological agent by contamination
of food or water supplies late in a distribution chain
339
Increase the environmental stability of a biological agent by
mechanical means, e.g., microencapsulation
224
Confer resistance to therapeutically useful antibiotics or antiviral agents 2 2 4
Facilitate the production of biological agents 2 2 4
Enhance the dissemination of a biological agent by contamination of
food or water supplies early in a distribution chain
313
Enhance the dissemination of a biological agent as powder or aerosol 1 2 2
Synthetic creation of viruses 2 1 2
Render a vaccine ineffective 1 1 1
Enhance the virulence of a biological agent 1 1 1
Increase the transmissibility of a biological agent 1 1 1
Enhance the infectivity of a biological agent 1 1 1
Alter the host range of a biological agent 1 1 1
Render a non-pathogenic biological agent virulent 1 1 1
Insertion of virulence factors 1 1 1
Enhance the resistance of a biological agent to host immunological defence 1 1 1
Insertion of host genes into a biological agent to alter the immune or neural response 1 1 1
Generate a novel pathogen 1 1 1
Increase the environmental stability of a biological agent by genetic modification 1 1 1
Enable the evasion of diagnostic or detection modalities 1 1 1
Targeting materials to specific locations in the body 1 1 1
Calculated according to the formula total threat = (expertise threshold) 6(equipment threshold), this table presents individual DURC activities according to the ease
with which a terrorist organization could be expected to replicate the work, based on expertise and equipment thresholds. The highest threat level comes from DURC
activities that were deemed to require overcoming only low expertise and low equipment thresholds (such as contaminating a food or water source with an unaltered
pathogen). Conversely, the lowest threat comes from highly sophisticated DURC activities that would need to overcome high equipment and expertise thresholds, such
as those that would be required to substantially alter the genetic nature of a pathogen.
doi:10.1371/journal.ppat.1001253.t001
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ated. Biosecurity policy discussions could
gain more nuance and credibility by
adopting more sophisticated notions about
the challenges inherent in conducting and
replicating advanced research. The life
sciences community has an obvious self-
interest in this, and might best achieve it
by emphasizing the oft-unacknowledged
factors inherent to successful high tech
research, including those related to social
contingencies and tacit knowledge. Thus
far, when life scientists have entered the
fray, they have tended to reinforce the
‘‘high-tech’’ perspective, even if their
objectives have been to argue against strict
biosecurity controls and/or to encourage
the life sciences to engage in debates about
the risks and benefits of its research [34–
36].
Many agree about the importance of
threat mitigation measures that prepare
for the eventuality of a bioterrorism attack,
irrespective of its source [37,38]. Examples
include encouraging the development of
diagnostics, vaccines, and therapeutics, as
well as empowering public health agencies
to strengthen defenses against communi-
cable diseases. Such approaches have the
additional advantage that they take the
broadest possible view of the threat
spectrum by also preparing for attacks by
the most successful ‘‘bioterrorists’’ of all,
nature and globalization, which have led
to the emergence of numerous new
communicable diseases in recent years
[39–41]. A focus on strengthening global
health security has been put forward by
the Obama administration [42] and the
European Commission [38], and has also
gained prominence in fora such as the
Biological and Toxin Weapons Conven-
tion [43]. Public health, too, is dual use: it
can be leveraged to counter natural and
intentional disease outbreaks.
Supporting Information
Text S1 Dual-use assessments reviewed
in this study (in reverse chronological
order).
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.ppat.
1001253.s001 (0.05 MB PDF)
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